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ABSTRACT I t  is suggested that the addition of bigeneric or bispecific nomina to 
designate fossils which are intermediate between two chronogenera or chronospecies is 
inadvisable, because the use of either of these categories to describe cases involving 
a single phyletic line, consisting of a continuous chain of time-sequential populations, 
misrepresents the nature of the evolutionary processes involved; and that in such 
cases fossils might best be referred to by specimen numbers. 
In re-reading Raymond Dart’s epoch- 
making paper “Australopithecus africanus: 
The Man-Ape of South Africa” (’251, this 
writer was reminded of Tobias’s recent 
(’69) proposal for the modification of the 
International Rules of Zoological Nomen- 
clature to allow the use of bigeneric 
nomina to designate a group of fossils 
which are intermediate between two con- 
secutive genera, and bispecific nomina to 
designate fossils which are intermediate 
between two consecutive species. 
In his evaluation of the significance of 
the juvenile Taungs skull designated as 
Australopithecus africanus, Dart noted 
that it represented 
. . , a creature well advanced beyond modern 
anthropoids in  just those characters, facial and 
cerebral, which are to be anticipated in an ex- 
tinct link between man and his simian ancestor. 
At the same time, it is equally evident that a 
creature with anthropoid brain capacity and 
lacking the distinctive, localised temporal expan- 
sions which appear to be concomitant with and 
necessary to articulate man, is no true man, It 
is therefore logically regarded as a man-like ape. 
I propose tentatively, then, that a new family of 
Homo-simiadae be created for the reception of 
the group of individuals which it represents. . . . 
Dart’s proposal with regard to taxonomic 
categories at the family level is paralleled 
by that of Tobias at the levels of genera 
and species; as both indicate a recognition 
of the continuity of hominid descent, and 
an understanding of the evolutionary 
processes involved, they have much to 
recommend them. Nonetheless, this does 
not in itself establish a sufficient cause for 
the adoption of systems of bigeneric or bi- 
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specific nomina. It is evident that fossil 
hominids are animals and, as Simpson 
(’63) has emphasized, the appropriate 
language for discussing their classification 
and relationships is that of animal tax- 
onomy. The principles governing this 
language are contained in the Rules of 
Zoological Nomenclature (Stoll et al., ’61), 
which do not at present sanction dual 
systems of nomenclature. 
Tobias’s suggestion was prompted by the 
group of fossils consisting of Olduvai Bed I 
hominids 4, 6, 7, and 8, and Olduvai Bed I1 
hominids 13, 14, and perhaps 16. Tobias 
noted that in addition to the original idea 
that these remains belong to a separate 
taxon, Homo habilis, at least five additional 
taxonomic names had already been applied 
to them by different workers, although 
most are agreed that the habilis group of 
fossils represents “an intermediate form” 
between Australopithecus and Homo. 
Part of the disagreement in this case, 
as recognized by Tobias, arises from the 
necessity of applying names which indicate 
discontinuous categories to specimens 
which represent samples drawn from a 
continuum of hominid populations which 
followed one another sequentially through 
time. But the use of bigeneric or bispecific 
nomina will not, in the long run, provide 
a satisfactory solution to this problem. 
If one accepts “Homo habilis” as a form 
intermediate between Australopithecus 
1 As is generally quite well known, this nomen is 
technically incorrect on several grounds: family 
names must be based on generic names, must not be 
hyphenated, and must end in -idae. 
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africanus and Homo erectus and shows 
this by making it 
Australopithecus ---. 
H o m o -  
- habilis 
or its more easily printed equivalent, Aus- 
tralopithecus/Horno habilis (Ewer, ’67), 
what does one do with the forms - which 
must have existed and probably will be 
found - between, for example, Australo- 
pithecus/Homo habilis and Homo erectus? 
If it is generally acknowledged that with 
these hominids we are dealing with an evo- 
lutionary continuum, the use of a series 
of names such as 
Australopithecus africanus 
Australopithecus/Homo habilis 
and Homo erectus 
simply replaces two taxonomic categories, 
A. africanus and H .  erectus, with the three 
above, without increasing our understand- 
ing of the evolutionary processes involved; 
and it is doubtful that those who do not 
accept the idea that an evolutionary series 
is represented here will be induced to ac- 
cept the name applied to the intermediate 
category, 
In his article Tobias asked “Granted that 
bigger samples confirm that Homo habizis 
is an intermediate form, how are we to 
name such formes de passage?” The an- 
swer to this question depends on the pur- 
pose for which such names are sought. 
Taxonomic nomina are not meant to be 
applied as labels for one or a few speci- 
mens. For purposes of discussion of in- 
dividual specimens, use of their specimen 
numbers: Olduvai I hominids 4, 6, 7, 8, 
etc., should be quite sufficient. Simpson 
(’63) has noted that a designation such 
as this -by a collection or repository sym- 
bol, and a catalogue number referring 
uniquely to each specimen -- is practi- 
cally universal in zoology, although not 
yet in anthropology.2 If this procedure were 
adopted it might have, aside from sim- 
plicity, at least one other salient advantage 
to recommend it: immediate descriptions 
of such material could be published (hope- 
fully accompanied by standardized mea- 
surements and photographs or line draw- 
ings, and ideally followed by the produc- 
tion of accurate casts for study by others) 
without the necessity either for making a 
hasty judgment about the taxonomic status 
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of the specimen, or the alternative of de- 
laying publication of a description until 
such a decision about the proper taxonomic 
position has been lengthily considered. 
This would enable other workers in the 
field to come to their own conclusions on 
the subject, and might either eliminate 
much of the debate which often accom- 
panies such taxonomic designations, or at 
least provide a more substantive basis for 
the ensuing discussions 
The practice suggested here, of referring 
to fossils by their specimen numbers, does 
not preclude the assignment of proper 
taxonomic names to given specimens, nor 
does it suggest any criteria which might 
be used; it does obviate the necessity for 
drawing numerous fine taxonomic distinc- 
tions if doing so, in itself, adds nothing 
to our understanding of the evolutionary 
process. There is a strong implication here 
that where the case is one of phyletic evo- 
lution, and forms representing a number 
of intermediate populations are known, 
perhaps a simple taxonomic system, in- 
telligently used, is the best. Such a system 
was suggested by Mayr (’50): that fossil 
and recent hominids be classified into a 
single genus (Homo) with three time-suc- 
cessive species ( transvaaEensis,S erectus, 
and sapiens). Although Mayr subsequently 
altered his opinion on this to accept the 
more standard view that in South Africa 
during the Upper Vill afranchian there were 
two distinct contemporaneous types of 
early hominids, Australopithecus and Par- 
anthropus, which merit generic separation 
from each other and from Homo, some 
other students of human evolution, this 
writer included, still believe that the evi- 
dence favors his earlier position. 
Uniting all of the above hominids into 
the simple genus Homo is done in recog- 
nition of the ecological significance of up- 
right, bipedal posture and tool use, which 
one can consider to have placed all homi- 
nids, even the earliest ones, onto a unique 
ZThe problems which arise because of the failure 
to follow this practice are not confined to Olduvai 
hominids. “As another example, no one maintains 
that Telanthsopus is a valid taxon at the generic level, 
but no way has been found to refer to the specimens 
in question except as Telanthropus, an NS designation 
[the technical Neo-Linnaean name, or nomen] that 
necessarily implies a taxonomic conclusion agreed to 
be incorrect” (Simpson, ’63). 
3This nomen also is technically incorrect, and 
should be Homo africanus rather than H m o  trans- 
vaalensis. 
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adaptive plateau (others might consider 
the adaptive zone or plateau of hominids 
to be defined by different characteristics, 
and on these grounds exclude the earlier 
forms from the genus Homo) .  It might 
thus be maintained that all of the above- 
mentioned hominids should be considered 
as an evolutionary species; according to 
Simpson (’61) this is “a lineage (an an- 
cestral-descendant sequence of popula- 
tions) evolving separately from others and 
with its own unitary evolutionary role and 
tendencies.” Any subdivision of this lineage 
into successive species as done by Mayr 
(’50) would of course be arbitrary, but 
nevertheless consistent with standard pal- 
eontological procedure if the morphologi- 
cal differences between the successive 
species were as great as those separating 
contemporaneous species of one genus. In 
any case classifications cannot be expected 
to fully express all that is known about 
the genetic and evolutionary relationships 
of the organisms concerned (Simpson, 
’62). 
By the application to hominid taxonomy 
of these procedures common to other 
branches of animal taxonomy, the number 
of arbitrary subdivisions of a lineage 
would be kept to a minimum, contrasting 
with Tobias’s proposal for the creation of 
bigeneric and bispecific nomina, which 
would result in overly fine subdivisions of 
an evolutionary continuum, a clumsier 
nomenclature, and the creation of an illu- 
sion of nonexistent taxonomic complexity. 
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